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Abstract 
 
South Africa, like other liberal democracies worldwide, is characterised by 
constant tension between government and the media, particularly the press. 
At the centre of the tension is the need by government to maintain a certain 
level of state secrecy on the grounds of national security on the one hand, 
and the need for transparency and the right of access to information on the 
other. Both these rights are provided for in international and local statutory 
instruments. Press reports about an alleged secret procurement by South 
Africa’s Department of Defence of a spy satellite have also heightened the 
tension. 
 
The purpose of the research is to explore the nature of the tension through a 
case study focusing on some national newspapers. The study examines if 
the South African press, which, when it dispensed information to the public, 
published sensitive state information that detrimentally impacted national 
security. 
 
This research shows that in some instances local newspapers published 
classified and sensitive information relating to national security. Although a 
court of law is the proper organ to determine whether the press contravened 
the law by publishing sensitive security information, the disclosure arguably 
prejudiced the national security interests of South Africa.   
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Press Coverage of a National Security Issue  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
 
The relationship between governments and private media across the world is 
more often than not tense due to competing interests of state secrecy on the 
grounds of national security, on one hand, and the right to know, on the other.  
 
There is no consensus among academics on the most appropriate definitions 
of a state and national security. For the purpose of this paper, a state will be 
defined in accordance with the Global Policy Forum’s definition, where a 
state, which is comprised of an executive, a bureaucracy, courts and other 
institutions, is the means of rule over a defined or "sovereign" territory 
(https://www.globalpolicy.org/nations-a-states). According to the International 
Working Group on National Security (IWGNS), national security is the first 
and vital obligation of government. It involves the safety and security of the 
country and its citizens by guarding national values and interests against 
threats (internal and external) that have the potential to undermine the 
security of the state, society and citizens (http://issat.dcaf.ch/Share/People-
and- Organisations/Organisations/International-Working-Group). 
 
Although there are different views and understandings of what national 
security is, the United Nations’ (UN) Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) states that national security cannot be achieved at the expense of 
suppression of human rights (http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index. 
shtml#a19). At the same time, the UN also recognises the need to limit the 
right to freedom of expression in pursuit of national security 
(http://www.un.org/en/documents/ udhr/index.shtml#a29). 
 
Governments often resort to passing strict laws that are aimed at restricting 
the press from publishing classified or sensitive state information and 
material deemed to compromise national security. Such laws are sometimes 
used to cover-up irregular activities such as corruption, mismanagement of 
state funds, etc. which, if exposed in the media, pose no threat to national 
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security. Such legislation is often in conflict with the UN, international and 
national legislation on freedom of expression. South Africa’s (SA) 
Constitution provides for freedom of expression and media, but at the same 
time limits freedom of expression to not promote instability. However, the 
contention over the extent of the freedom of expression results in a continued 
relatively tense relationship between the South African government and 
media in general, and the press in particular. 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Tension between the South African government and the press continues to 
exist over the publication of classified or sensitive state information and other 
material government deems will compromise national security. To tighten 
legislation that prevents the media, among others, from exposing state 
secrets, the government has developed the Protection of State Information 
Bill. This development, in turn, has heightened the tension. Although 
government has advanced as a rationale for the proposed legislation that the 
press usually irresponsibly publishes sensitive information that can 
compromise national security, no assessment has so far been done to 
establish the veracity of this assertion. It is, therefore, important to conduct 
an assessment of the local press on how it covers issues that have a bearing 
on national security. By ascertaining whether the local press transgresses 
responsible journalistic norms and infringes on national security, this study 
will add to the body of knowledge on state secrecy versus transparency and 
free flow of information in a democracy. 
 
1.2  Purpose Statement 
This study examined if the local press, in pursuit of the right-to-know and 
public interest, published classified or sensitive state information that 
detrimentally impacted or could have harmed national security. The research 
focused on the coverage by local national newspapers of Consolidated 
Project Flute – reportedly a reconnaissance satellite acquisition project of the 
South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The Department of Defence 
(DOD) reportedly entered into a contract with the Russian company, NPO 
Mashinostroyenia, for the development of a Kondor-E satellite for Defence 
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Intelligence in 2006. The satellite reportedly placed SA in a position to 
conduct its own aerial surveillance in Africa, potentially up to Israel, and 
capable of collecting radar images at night through cloud cover of objects as 
small as cars.  
 
This issue is relevant and appropriate to use as a case study for this study 
because it involves information relating to activities and operations of the 
SANDF and may impact on national security. Press reports on Consolidated 
Project Flute started gaining currency in 2014 and the issue was widely 
covered in the press. This case study presents an opportunity to examine 
whether the local press, in its duty to inform the public, had reported on what 
it should not have reported or went beyond what was necessary considering 
SA national security, as sometimes claimed by government.  
 
The purpose is to ascertain if the press compromised or undermined national 
security when it disclosed such information. Due to the limited timeframe of 
the study, the research was limited to SA national daily and weekly 
newspapers. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
The study was an attempt to, through a case study, answer the following 
questions:  
• Did local newspapers publish sensitive information relating to 
national security? 
• If so, was there any rationale behind the publication of such 
information? 
• Did the published information actually or potentially compromise or 
undermine the national security of South Africa?  
 
The remaining chapters of this paper explore and endeavor to address these 
questions. Chapter 2 presents literature review that provides insight into the 
issues that are pivotal to the paper. This is followed by Chapter 3 which 
outlines the research methodology used in the research process. This 
includes research orientation, research design and analysis. Chapters 4 and 
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5 present detailed findings and subsequent analysis of the data respectively. 
Chapter 6 provides qualitative interpretation of the findings. Finally, Chapter 7 
concludes by providing logical reflections and remarks on the findings. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
Tension between Government and Media over Freedom of Expression 
The escalating tension between governments and the media worldwide over 
the freedom of expression concept is a complex and interesting 
phenomenon. The tension stems from competing roles of the press and 
government, which are to, respectively, inform and to protect a country and 
its citizens. The press, on the one hand, advocates for transparency on the 
basis of the public’s right to know. On the other hand, government wants to 
keep its information secret to protect its citizens, infrastructure and 
operations from being compromised (Okon, 2013). This literature review is 
used as a basis on which tension between the South African government and 
the media over competing interests of national security and media freedom 
can be explored. In this regard the interest is specifically on nature of 
incidents where the local media published material deemed to be of national 
security importance. The review focuses on issues pertaining to national 
security, international law and standards on media freedom and the SA legal 
framework and media relations.  
 
2.1  National security 
As indicated above, there is no all-encompassing definition of national 
security because there is no broad consensus on the meaning of security 
concepts. Security is a concept consisting of multiple and contested 
meanings. Thus, any security consensus is likely to be precarious and 
temporary, especially in times when there are rapid political change and  
systematic shifts such as globalisation, democratisation and dynamic 
changes in the international system (Hutchful, 2008).  
 
National security has been evolving over the years following new threats 
emanating from dynamic international political, economic and cultural 
environments (Hotchkiss, 2010). Theories related to security can be divided 
into two broad groups, namely conservative theories and transformative 
theories.  
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At the centre of conservative theories are realist and idealists theories which 
view threats to the security of the state or country as exogenous. In the 
realist theory, national security has traditionally been about the survival of the 
state against external military threats. The realists view national security at 
the centre of a struggle among countries to gain superiority over each other 
for their own national interests, under a global environment regarded as 
anarchic. Realists believe that the lack of international central authority to 
enforce cooperation among states result in states being selfish and more 
concerned with their own survival. To attain this goal (survival) states then 
use military force to secure and protect their interests, mainly national 
security. The idealists believe that the security of states lies in the moral 
quality of their behaviour. In this regard states share common interests and 
values and agree on common rules of behaviour to enable them to hold each 
other accountable.  
 
On the other hand, security in transformative or critical theories concern itself 
with the global political economy of development and the problems 
associated with the plight of the poorer, marginalised states in the global 
economy (McGowan; Cornelissen; & Nel, 2006). Some proponents of this 
approach advocate that national security should revolve around human 
security which encompasses protection of the economy, food, sanitation, 
politics, environment and individuals as well as communities. (Hutchful, 
2008). 
 
Security is currently being viewed in terms of two opposing approaches. One 
is that of “traditional, military or state-centric security and the other is human 
security and security of individuals and groups”. Traditional security concerns 
the pursuit of national security objectives through the strengthening of military 
capacity. This security paradigm sees threat to state security as primarily that 
of a military attack emanating from other states as well as intra-state conflict. 
Non-traditional approaches criticise the traditional approach for failing to go 
beyond security analysis of the military challenges and the state as the main 
actor thereby disregarding threats to human beings, such as state failure, 
civil wars, disease, and environmental degradation. (Du Pisani, 2007).  
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Human security addresses relations between states and their citizens and 
concerns everyday personal security concerns such as poverty, 
marginalisation and injustice of citizens of a state. Human security is 
normative and advocates for ethical responsibility to put human at the centre 
of security as per internationally recognised standards of human rights and 
governance.  Human security encompasses national security - control over 
coercion and military force; political security – respect for human rights and 
rule of law; and social security – provision of an economic safety net. In other 
words human security complements state security in some other respects. 
According to human security, for policy and security analysis to be effective 
and legitimate, they should focus on the individual as the referent and 
primary beneficiary. It is interesting to note that that the African concept of 
human security, as contained in the Conference on Security, Stability, 
Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) and Common African 
Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) African Union (AU) Solemn 
Declarations, to some extent differ with the general human security 
approach. The African articulation of human security, rather, endeavours to 
re-orient security in more responsive and democratic direction rather than 
rejecting the ‘traditional’, ‘military’ or ‘state-centric’ concept of security. 
(Hutchful, 2008; Newman, 2010)  
Despite its popularity, academic security studies have not fully embrace the 
concept of human security approach. There is no consensus on what 
constitutes human security even among its supporters. Critics widely criticise 
human security as a broad concept which vagueness undermines its 
effectiveness. They argue its failure to clearly articulate what human security 
is, hamper research work and policy development in this area. 
 
Other than the two dominant approaches to security, critical security theorists 
provide a different security paradigm to traditional security and human 
security approaches. Critical security theory consists of wide-ranging group 
of approaches opposed to non-traditional security theory which is premised 
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on military defence of territory against external threats. Critical security 
approaches challenge the prevailing security order and its institutions as the 
source of insecurity rather than security. They challenge prevailing structures 
of power and power relations, and also existing security policy assumptions 
and the interests they serve. Although it sees individuals as primary referent 
of security, critical approaches to security also include new areas of analysis 
such as economic security, environmental security and societal security 
(Newman, 2010).  
 
2.2  Safeguarding of national security 
Governments have the responsibility of ensuring the well-being and security 
of their citizens through safeguarding their national security, territorial 
integrity and public safety (Von Halem Verlag, 2011). Therefore, it is 
generally agreed that governments should be allowed to keep some level of 
secrecy relating to national security interests to successfully perform some of 
their responsibilities (Colaresi, 2014). Secrecy may be justified and 
necessary, for example, to protect authorised intelligence operations as well 
as military strategies and operations, to prevent espionage, to counter 
terrorism, in war time, and to protect confidential policy development 
discussions that, if made public, will likely compromise national security or 
foreign relations of the relevant country (Aftergood, 2010).  
 
Article 19 of the UDHR indicates that it is incumbent on a state to articulate 
clearly the legal basis for restricting the right to freedom of expression 
relating to its national security needs (http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr). 
Democracies worldwide have legislation that legitimise state secrecy on the 
grounds of national security. Such legislation empower governments to 
classify and keep information secret and also to punish those responsible for 
divulging classified information. Recently governments have been 
intensifying efforts to tighten information secrecy legislation in the face of the 
increasing threat of terrorism and growing demand for transparency 
(http://www.right2info.org/exceptions-to-access). Paradoxically, the same 
governments pass laws that promote access to state information.  
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According to the South Africa’s Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) 
2 of 2000, access to information may be restricted based on the protection of 
certain confidential information, such as information on:  
• law enforcement and legal proceedings; defence, security, and 
international relations of the Republic (this includes information about 
military tactics or strategy, and operations to prepare, detect and prevent 
hostilities; information relating to weapons procurement, capacity and 
development; information relating to the characteristics, capabilities, 
vulnerabilities, performance, potential, deployment or functions of any 
military force, unit or personnel; and information held for intelligence 
purposes);  
• methods of, and scientific or technical equipment for collecting, 
assessing or handling information for intelligence purposes; or  
• economic interests and financial welfare of the Republic and commercial 
activities of public bodies. 
 
Classification of documents is a key tool that governments use to protect 
sensitive information. It is argued that government officials are the most 
suited to decide which information to keep secret and which to make public 
as journalists are generally not trained in security matters to be able to 
evaluate information related to national security. Furthermore, journalists may 
not be qualified to unilaterally decide whether people will be better off or not 
with disclosure of information deemed to be of national security importance 
(Freivogel, 2009). Similarly, not all government officials, including those 
working with sensitive information, are suitable to make judgements whether 
to classify or not. The challenge lies in whether the state has sufficient 
capacity to properly classify information in its possession: are state officials 
suitably qualified to classify information, and for how long? In South Africa, 
classification guidelines as per the Minimum Information Security Standards 
(MISS) Policy require that information be classified either as “restricted”, 
“confidential”, “secret”, or “top secret” depending on the nature of perceived 
sensitivity. However, guidelines are lacking in terms of giving clarity on 
conditions under which information may be reclassified. In addition, lack of 
clear criteria and proper oversight on the classification process in South 
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Africa may result in information being routinely and thus wrongly classified, 
resulting in it being shielded from public access (Africa, 2009). 
 
2.3  The importance of a free media 
Over emphasis on information secrecy on the ground of national security 
runs the risk of undermining the rights and thus the work of other entities 
such as the media. Opposing this tendency, right to know and transparency 
advocacy groups criticise governments for sometimes over-classifying 
information to cover-up irregular activities or incompetence. For example, 
events such as elections may incentivise governments to refuse access to 
certain information that would negatively affect the ruling party’s success in 
the next elections.  
 
Media play a key role in enlightening people, exposing corruption and 
enhancing political accountability in a liberal democracy through 
dissemination of information (Camaj, 2013). Democracy cannot function 
effectively without freedom of expression in particular media freedom. By 
publishing government information relating to policy, programmes and state 
activities, the media empower the public to become active citizen and 
become involved in issues relating to governance of their country (Stone, 
2009). Information relating to policy is essential as it capacitates citizens to 
assess the need and the suitability of government policy. Citizens utilise this 
information to compel government to account to them by formulating policies 
that are responsive to their needs as voters or risk being voted out during 
election time (Camaj, 2013; Freivogel, 2009). Therefore, legislation that limits 
media freedom deprives government of constructive criticism of its weak 
government policies or poorly implemented policies. Criticism of government 
should be regarded as an act of patriotism because it may spur the country to 
do better. Concerning corruption, literature on characteristics of media 
systems indicates that where a state has a higher degree of control of the 
media, corruption levels tend to be higher while corruption levels tend be 
lower in countries where there is media freedom (Camaj, 2013). In this way 
the restriction of media freedom does not only impact the media and citizens, 
but also national security because government policies that are not well 
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scrutinised by the media and thus citizens could result in social instability in a 
country.  
 
In some instances the media is believed to play a critical role in setting the 
agenda for debating the national development goals. However, the ability of 
the media to play this role meaningfully is compromised in instances where 
the media is controlled by partisan interest groups with conflicting interests 
(White, 2011). Without true transparency and accountability, the role of the 
media as democracy’s guardian of the truth is compromised. It is generally 
believed that a free press enhances the consolidation process of democracy 
as it is regarded as an integral part of the development of citizens in 
democratic dispensations (Cohen-Almagor, 2005). However, it seems the 
notion remains an assumption as no model exists which shows how the 
relationship between democracy and the media works (Camaj, 2013). 
 
2.4 Media freedom: International and regional laws and standards 
Media freedom and freedom of expression rights are recognised by the UN, 
continental as well as regional bodies. There are a number of globally-
recognised instruments that attempt to provide guidance on how to strike a 
balance between the need to keep information secret and the need for public 
interest to access information. The following are the main international and 
regional instruments: 
 
• UN: Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
(http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a19). The Article 
explicitly expresses that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression. 
• UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Good 
practices on legal and institutional frameworks for intelligence services 
and their oversight (2010) 
(http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Terrorism/Pages). 
• Study on the Right to Truth, Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (2006) 
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(http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx). 
• Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, UN Commission on 
Human Rights, Resolution 2005/81 (2005) 
(http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/TruthJustice Reparation/ Pages) 
• Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 
adopted by UN GA Resolution 60/147 (2005) 
(https://www.google.co.za/?) 
• The United Nations Human Rights Committee, in July 2011, adopted 
General Comment 34, detailing its interpretation of governments’ 
obligations to protect freedom of opinion and expression, as 
guaranteed by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. It stated that access to information is a human right 
(https://www.google.co.za/?gfe_rd=cr&ei=odKIV_WQN). 
• Council of Europe: Freedom of expression is protected by Article 10 of 
the European Convention. It promotes free flow of information and ideas, 
and has limited state powers to restrict freedom of expression 
(http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention). 
• Organisation of American States (OAS): American Convention on 
Human Rights (1969). Article 13 states that “everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought and expression, the right to seek, receive and impart 
information through any other medium of choice” 
(http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp).  
• African Union: A Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression was 
adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(ACHPR) in October 2002 (http://www.hrea.org).  
• South African Development Community (SADC): Article 20 (Media 
Freedom) of the SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport, 
developed in 2001, states that “State Parties shall take necessary 
measures to ensure the development of media that are editorially 
independent and conscious of their obligations to the public and 
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greater society” (http://www.sadc.int/files/Protocol_on_Culture 
Information_and sport2001). 
 
At a regional level, SADC members, excluding Swaziland but including South 
Africa, have provisions in their constitutions which guarantee freedom of 
expression. In some of these countries, the right is not expressed merely as 
freedom of expression, but overtly expressed as freedom of expression 
including press and other media (Kanyongolo, n.d.). 
 
All the aforementioned instruments are an attempt at ensuring freedom of 
expression, including media, and access to information while at the same 
time taking into consideration the need to limit access to sensitive information 
that can harm national security of a country. The freedom of expression and 
related rights can only be restricted in certain circumstances to protect the 
rights and reputations of others or to protect national security, public order, 
public health or morals (http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr). 
 
The global principles on national security and the right to information, also 
known as the “Tshwane Principles”, is another effort aimed at improving a 
proper balance between secrecy and transparency imperatives. The 
principles, developed by 17 organisations and five academic centres across 
the world on 12 June 2013, provide a framework within which governments 
can handle information relating to national security. The principles are based 
on international and regional law and standards, global practices, the general 
principles of law recognised by the community of nations, and the writings of 
experts (http://www.right2info.org/exceptions-to-access). 
 
2.5  Media accountability and responsibility 
Although media freedom enhances democracy, a free media poses 
challenges concerning accountability and irresponsible reporting which can 
harm individuals or national security. Media accountability, which concerns 
consequences of reporting, can be defined as a process by which media may 
be expected or obliged to render an account to its stakeholders such as 
individuals, groups, or organisations for goodwill purposes. Media that do not 
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account to its constituencies or public can intentionally mislead the public. 
The power of the media to influence the public and to shape perceptions 
cannot be underestimated. This type of manipulation can harm government 
or individuals or societies. It is therefore in the interest of the media to guard 
against such practices as this could in the final analysis work against it 
(Duncan, 2011; Murthy, 2007).  
 
While exercising its role to inform and lighten the public, the media has the 
fundamental duty to respect human rights. Irresponsible reporting can have 
an impact on national security. Counter terrorism efforts by countries fighting 
terrorism, for example, sometimes get frustrated by unnecessary coverage of 
messages and acts of terrorism which assists terrorists to spread their 
message. In this regard, it is argued that the extent to which terrorism is 
reported on will, in turn, determine its success rate. In some instances, during 
security emergencies such as plane hijackings or hostage situations, some 
media go to the extent of publishing movements of security personnel 
responsible for handling the situation which could endanger the lives of 
victims (Cohen-Almagor, 2005). Another example of irresponsible reporting 
relates to the publication on 25 July 2010 of WikiLeaks’ ‘Afghan War Diary’ 
which revealed the identities of hundreds of Afghan people who assisted the 
coalition forces in Afghanistan and put them at the risk of revenge attacks 
(Karhula, 2011).  
 
Claims by governments in particular are often made against the press that it 
violates professional norms and therefore need to account. In attempts to 
enhance the quality of journalism and also to avoid media restrictive laws, 
media associations around the world have developed journalism ethical 
codes and standards to guide its profession (Freivogel, 2009). Print media is 
often wary of statutory regulation as it fears that government can use it to 
interfere with its editorial content (Duncan, 2012).  
 
Self-regulation is the most common form of regulation in countries where 
press regulators have been introduced. Generally media self-regulatory 
principles concern truth-telling, independence, playing a watchdog role, 
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supporting the public’s right-to-know principle, and responsibility. Truth-telling 
relates to accuracy and standards for factual reporting where journalists are 
expected to be as accurate as possible and to seek reliable sources. 
Responsibility or harm limitations principle advocates that some 
considerations need to be given to the negative consequences of full 
disclosure of certain information. In addition to the commonly used ethical 
codes the European journalism codes of ethics also include a concern with 
discriminatory references in news based on race, religion, sexual orientation, 
and physical or mental disabilities (Freivogel, 2009). Some of the issues of 
concern relating to media accountability such as sensationalist and bias 
reporting as well as other related issues are often not covered by laws and 
only covered by professional journalist codes of ethics (von Halem Verlag, 
2011).   
 
In addition to the commonly used ethical codes, the European journalism 
codes of ethics also include a concern with discriminatory references in news 
based on race, religion, sexual orientation, and physical or mental disabilities 
(Freivogel, 2009). Some of the issues of concern relating to media 
accountability, such as sensationalist and biased reporting as well as other 
related issues, are often not covered by legislation and only covered by 
professional journalist codes of ethics (Von Halem Verlag, 2011). These 
codes are regarded as informal institutions. Therefore, adherence to these 
cannot be legally enforced. 
 
Although one of the roles of the media is to monitor if other institutions, 
including government, adhere to ethical standards, it is ironic that the media 
is often accused of not observing its own ethical codes (Freivogel, 2009). 
Due to media competition brought about by globalisation, journalistic ethical 
codes are compromised in pursuit of profit as journalists are put under 
pressure to work towards meeting commercial targets (Duncan, 2012; 
Murthy, 2007). In this regard, self-regulation can fail to play an effective 
oversight role over the media industry (Duncan, 2011). Irresponsible media 
reporting affects the national security of countries in different ways. Counter 
terrorism efforts by countries fighting terrorism, for example, sometimes get 
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frustrated by unnecessary coverage of messages and acts of terrorism which 
in the process assist terrorists to spread their message. In this regards, it is 
argued that the extent to which terrorism is covered will in turn determine its 
success rate (Cohen-Almagor, 2005). In some instances, during security 
emergencies such as plane hijackings or hostage takings some media go to 
the extent of publishing movements of military personnel which could 
endanger the lives of innocent victims (Cohen-Almagor, 2005). Another 
danger of the media that do not account to its constituencies or public is to 
intentionally mislead the public. The power of the media to influence the 
public and to shape perceptions cannot be underestimated. This type of 
manipulation could harm government or individuals or societies. It is 
therefore in the interest of the media to guard against such practices as this 
could in the final analysis work against it. 
 
The media is, therefore, expected to exercise some restraint and consider 
possible consequences of its publications, particularly when the story is likely 
to threaten the lives of people on whom the story is centred. Journalists and 
media houses should display professionalism and responsibility when 
handling sensitive information (White, 2011). Before publishing a story that 
has the potential to compromise national security or lives of people, 
journalists, including editors, should make a critical assessment of the impact 
of the relevant story. These considerations will go a long way in easing 
tension between media and governments and may also enhance media 
freedom as governments are then likely to refrain from introducing new laws 
aimed at restricting media freedom.  
 
A counter argument to this is that the publication of information or material 
which can threaten some people’s lives is justifiable on conditions that the 
intention is to expose government’s illegal activities, such as killing of people 
and violations of human rights. Advocates for this position cite exposure by 
WikiLeaks as one of examples where value of exposure outweighs the 
consequences of exposure (Karhula, 2011).  
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2.6  Limits to freedom of expression  
Although Article 19 of the UDHR advocates for freedom of expression, Article 
29 (UDHR) expresses limitations on the freedom by considering sensitivity 
and respect for the rights of others, including national security 
(http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr). Using Article 19 (UDHR) as its 
foundation, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), 
expands on the limits of the rights by stating that: the article shall not prevent 
states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises, and exercise of the rights may be subject to such formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety (Sturges, 2006). Chapter 2, Section 16 (2) 
of the Constitution of the Republic South Africa (Act No. 108 of 1996) also 
states that freedom of expression does not extend to, among others, 
propaganda for war and advocacy of hatred based on race, ethnicity, gender 
or religion (http://www.gov.za/documents). It is therefore imperative to view 
freedom of expression in the context of the various other human rights and 
appreciate its relationship with these.  
 
The aforementioned limitations are generally regarded as important and 
fundamental. However, these are not exhaustive. Human rights should be 
seen as a system where the sub-parts should work together in harmony for 
the system to function optimally. It is therefore important to view freedom of 
expression in the context of the various other human rights and appreciate 
their relationship. Similarly, efforts should be made to sensitise societies, 
including government and media, to find a balance among human rights to 
avoid harm and offence.  
 
2.7  International and regional media environment 
Although the constitutions of many countries protect the right of freedom of 
expression and/or those of the media, these rights are sometimes supressed 
on grounds of national security interests. It is argued that media freedom 
limiting laws can impact on the media and behaviour of journalists even if 
they are not effected due to perceptions that the legislation create 
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(McNamara, 2009).  
 
An increasing number of countries are resorting to legislation in an attempt to 
limit media in terms of reporting issues governments deem to be of national 
security importance. The tendency to restrict freedom of expression is more 
pronounced where national security and its related legislation are broadly 
defined. However, claims that the media irresponsibly report on issues that 
have the potential to undermine national security have been made by 
governments over the years, but not much evidence has been put forward to 
substantiate the claims. Responding to some of these legislations, the media 
expresses concern that sometimes national security laws unnecessarily 
protect governments from public scrutiny and efforts to fight corruption. 
Journalists regard themselves as patriotic as and therefore more suitable 
than government officials to make a judgement call whether the value of 
publishing a story for public interest outweighs the value for national security. 
They claim that government officials cannot be trusted due to the perception 
that they over classify information to hide corrupt or embarrassing activities 
(Freivogel, 2009). 
 
According to Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press 2014 Report, media 
across the world is to a varying degree still experiencing suppression and 
restriction. The report indicates that of the 199 countries and territories 
assessed in 2013, media in only 63 countries (32 percent) was rated as “free 
from suppression” and media in 71 countries (36 percent) was rated “partly 
free” while media in 65 (32 percent) remaining countries was rated “not free”. 
The report notes that the 10 worst-rated countries where independent media 
are either non-existent or hardly operate are: Belarus, Crimea, Cuba¸ 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan. 
 
In general, the assessment of the report has revealed the following relating 
media freedom environment in various regions of the world during the 
assessment period:  
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Americas  
 
In this region the report reveals that out of 35 countries 43 percent, 40 
percent, and 17 percent were rated free, partly free and not free respectively. 
Of these countries media in North America and to a lager extent the 
Caribbean enjoyed relatively higher freedom than was the case in Central 
and South America in 2013.  
 
Asia-Pacific 
 
The report showed that the Asia-Pacific region press freedom in 40 countries 
was 37.5 percent free, 30 percent partly free and 32.5 percent not free. The 
report indicated that while the level of media freedom is high in the Pacific 
Islands, Australasia, and parts of East Asia relative to the rest of the world, 
media freedom in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and other parts of East Asia 
was generally restricted. However, media freedom environment in China, 
which has the world’s most sophisticated censorship apparatus, was found to 
have improved in 2013 compared to 2012 period. 
 
Western Europe 
 
The region is one of the areas that invariably attain the highest level of press 
freedom worldwide with no country rated as not free in terms of media 
freedom. Of the 25 countries, 88 percent and 12 percent were rated free and 
partly free respectively. 
 
Central and Eastern Europe 
 
According the said report, out of 29 countries in this region, 24 percent, 13 
percent and 31 percent were rated free, partly free and not free respectively. 
Of note worthy, the report indicated that the media environment in Russia, 
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which is characterised by the prosecution of independent journalists and 
control over media outlets had deteriorated in 2013 period.  
 
Middle East and North Africa  
 
The report showed that out of 19 countries, no country was rated free while 
26 and 74 percent of the countries where rated partly free and free 
respectively. The region continued to have the world’s poorest ratings due to 
persisting restricting conditions, particularly on traditional media, of 
emergency rule, state ownership and editorial directives, harsh blasphemy 
legislation, and laws against insulting monarchs and public personalities.  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
According to the report, eight percent, 47 percent and 45 percent, of 49 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were rated free, partly free, and not free 
respectively. The media environment in the area is negatively affected by 
geo-political instability. The media freedom situation in the SADC region in 
particular is not that much different from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
Freedom of the Press 2014 Report indicated that in this region out of 50 
countries assessed, 21 were found not to have press freedom, 25 with a 
partly free press and only four enjoyed complete press freedom 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files). 
 
2.8  South African national security legal framework  
Although South Africa lacks a coherent national security strategy, the country 
has a regime of legislation to protect sensitive state information and key 
installations. Legislation in this regard includes the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996; the National Strategic Intelligence 
Act 39 of 1994; Intelligence Services Act 65 of 2002 as amended by the 
General Intelligence Laws Amendment Act 11 of 2013; the National Key 
Points Act 102 of 1980, and the MISS Policy. Furthermore, Defence Act 42 of 
2002; Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998; National Prosecuting Authority 
Act 32 of 1998; Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001; and Protection 
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of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 
2004 allow authorities to restrict reporting on the security forces, prisons and 
justice institutions (http://www.gov.za/documents). Notwithstanding the afore 
mentioned legislation, Chapter 2, Section 16 (1) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa guarantees freedom of expression and also makes 
provision for the right of the public to access official information through the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 
(http://www.gov.za/documents). 
 
SA, like most countries, is increasingly tightening information protection 
legislation. In this regard the formulation of the Protection of State 
Information Bill (POSIB), currently awaiting the signature of President Jacob 
Zuma, is intended to further strengthen the capacity of the state in protecting 
classified information. If passed into law, POSIB will criminalise the 
possession and disclosure of classified information, with potential prison 
sentences ranging from five to 25 years (http://www.gov.za/documents). The 
POSIB followed a resolution passed by the National General Council (NGC) 
of the African National Congress (ANC) in September 2010 declaring the 
existing print media self-regulatory system not working. The resolution further 
called on government to investigate effective regulatory system. Prior to this, 
the 2007 ANC Conference also took a resolution which recommended that a 
possibility be sought to establish a statutory Media Appeals Tribunal (MAT) to 
be accountable to Parliament and to adjudicate on complaints heard by the 
Press Ombudsman (Duncan, 2011). The media, civic organisation, 
opposition parties heavily criticised the introduction of the POSIB and other 
media regulatory measures suggested by the ANC. 
 
In 2012, the Press Freedom Commission (PFC) established by the South 
African National Editors’ Forum (SANEF) and Print Media South Africa 
(PMSA) to investigate the most viable regulatory system for the local media, 
advised against the idea of establishing the proposed MAT. The PFC 
recommended, among others, a system of independent co-regulation 
between the public and the press with no government representation. 
Following this, the self-regulating Press Council (PCSA) introduced set of 
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reforms including independent co-regulation and equal public and media 
representation chaired by a retired judge. The ANC expressed its satisfaction 
with the reforms (Freedom of the press 2013). 
 
Despite constitutional protection and existence of vocal media freedom 
advocacy groups, the press in SA is regarded as partly free while the country 
is ranked number 37 (0 being the best and 100 being the worst) in the world 
in terms of press freedom, according to Freedom of the Press Report 2014 
(http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/ default/files). Journalists and media 
establishments are sometimes harassed and threatened with legal action to 
force them not to publish or to retract certain information. For example in 
November 2011, lawyers for then presidential spokesperson threatened the 
Mail & Guardian with criminal prosecution for publishing that he lied to the 
anticorruption agency regarding his involvement in an arms-deal scandal 
from the late 1990s. The reporters responsible for the story were accused of 
stealing classified information in possession of government agency. In 
another example, in 2010 a journalist of Sunday Times was arrested for 
publishing stories alleging corruption by the then commissioner of the South 
African Police Service. The current President of South Africa personally sued 
local media outlets 11 times from the time he assumed office as Deputy 
President and until now as President for defamation.  
 
An alternative form of intimidation by government is to use its financial 
muscle to compel the press to cooperate with government. In 2011, the 
government announced a R1 million, cabinet-approved advertising budget 
that will be directed toward newspapers that are deemed not hostile to the 
government (http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013). 
 
The developing trend of tightening information protection legislation on the 
grounds of national security thereby possibly limiting media freedom 
contributes in heightening tension between government and the media.  
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2.9 Local press context and relation with government  
 
The South African media is somewhat different from that of other countries in 
terms of ownership which still reflects historical ownership pattern. For this 
reason, the ruling party has criticised the print media for being neo-liberal 
oriented. The media is also criticised for concerning itself with coverage that 
scrutinises political power rather than economic power and in the process 
entrenches economic and social inequalities in the country (Duncan, 2011). 
 
More often than not, the relationship between the media and state is that the 
media follows a nationally contextualised approach given the diverse 
dynamics of the media in different countries (Abraham, 2012). To better 
understand the approach of the South African press to security issues, it is 
important to appreciate the context within which it operates. The South 
African press operates in an environment that constitutionally guarantees 
freedom of expression, which includes freedom of the media. While the 
South African, like in many other countries, apply a mixture of characteristics 
of various media theories, the local press has strong characteristics of the 
libertarian or free press theory. The libertarian theory, the authoritarian 
theory, the communist theory, and the social responsibility theory fall under 
the normative press model, which seeks to define what the press must do in 
society. Normative theories are more focused in the relationship between 
Press and the Government than press and the audience. These theories are 
more concern about the ownership of the media and who controls the press 
or media in the country. (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1963) 
The development of the normative press models cannot be divorced from 
socio-economic conditions and thus each normative press theory is linked to 
a certain political system or ideology. The libertarian press theory is aligned 
to liberalism ideology and functions according to the libertarian principles. 
 
In the libertarian system, media is owned by the rich. The libertarian theory 
opposes interference by government in any aspect of the press. It is 
premised on the idea that individuals, including the media, should be free to 
publish anything they like, as long as it does not infringe on the freedom of 
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others. The theory encourages the press to inform, discover truth, and to be 
critical and play a watchdog role towards government (Siebert et al., 1963). 
 
It is in this light that the South African press believes that public and media 
scrutiny of the exercise of political and economic power is essential. These 
ideals are jealously guarded by the South African press and non-
governmental organisations apparently as a consequence of the restrictions 
experienced during the apartheid era. The advocacy for freedom of the 
media and expression in South Africa should be viewed within the context of 
past human rights violations under the apartheid rule when state excesses 
were committed under the cover of secrecy. The South African press has 
adopted a 12 point press code and it states that: 
“our work is guided at all times by the public interest, understood to describe 
information of legitimate interest or importance to citizens. As journalists, we 
commit ourselves to the highest standards of excellence, to maintain 
credibility and keep the trust of our readers. This means always striving for 
truth, avoiding unnecessary harm, reflecting a multiplicity of voices in our 
coverage of events, showing special concern for children and other 
vulnerable groups, and acting independently”. In  its preamble the press code 
states that the main purpose of gathering and distributing news and opinion 
is to serve society by informing citizens and enabling them to make informed 
judgements on the issues of the time (http://www.presscouncil.org.za/Content 
Page?code).  
 
The free press ideals of the libertarian press theory are inherently likely to 
clash with the need for government secrecy. The libertarian theory does not 
pronounce explicitly on the potential for conflict between a free press and 
national security interests, as well as on how to manage the conflict should it 
occur. The local press environment is regarded as relatively free, robust and 
critical in the African continent. In a liberal constitutional democracy like 
South Africa where freedom of expression is not unlimited, the application of 
the libertarian theory may be to some extent attributable to existing tension 
between the government and the press. In the light of the above background, 
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the South African press should therefore be seen as operating within a 
specific theoretical, social and political context. 
 
This review serves as a basis to examine the tension between the South 
African government and the press with a view to determine whether the local 
press publishes news items that can harm national security. The assessment 
will be guided by the conceptual framework of an ideal relationship between 
government and media where there is a right balance between national 
security and media freedom considerations (Cohen-Almagor, 2005). 
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Chapter 3:  Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Paradigm (strategy) 
The research was conducted within the qualitative research orientation, 
which is viewed as an approach that usually puts emphasis on words rather 
than quantification in the collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2012). 
Qualitative strategy has three key features that differentiate it from 
quantitative strategy in that it: regards the relationship between theory and 
research as inductive whereby the former is generated by the latter; 
emphasises that a researcher should see the world and social phenomenon 
through the eyes of the research participants in order to understand it better 
(interpretivist epistemology); and views social reality as an outcome of 
interactions between individuals (constructionist ontological position) 
(Bryman, 2012). 
 
As the objective of the study is to examine if newspapers reports on 
Consolidated Project Flute had undermined national security of SA, the 
strategy is more appropriate for this type of research because it requires that 
the researcher considers the context of the issues under focus. The 
emphasis is on analysis and interpretation of the articles and not necessarily 
the quantification of data. The advantages of this approach in this instance 
are that it allows for deeper understanding and interpretation of the news 
articles in the context of South Africa as a developing country and young 
democracy. 
 
3.2  Design  
Although various designs could be used to examine the nature of media 
coverage of issues concerning national security, a case study design was 
used in this study as a guide in collecting information concerning newspaper 
reports on Consolidated Project Flute. Case study in this regard was the 
most suitable method for conducting this type of research because the 
design had made it much easier to track and assess newspaper articles on 
the identified case for a specific period of time, which, in this case, was 12 
months. 
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3.3  Sampling 
While issues of interest to this topic are covered in both print and electronic 
media, the research was limited to the South African press for the purpose of 
reducing the study to a manageable size, considering time and resource 
constraints. Data was collected from seven out of 14 national newspapers, 
which were in circulation in 2014. A purposive sampling method, a non-
probability method which strategically selects units that are relevant to the 
research questions, was used to select the newspapers. The newspapers 
identified were four weekly papers: the Sunday Times, the Sunday 
Independent, City Press and Mail & Guardian, and three daily papers: 
Business Day, the Citizen and The New Age. The key consideration in 
selecting the newspapers was that the selected newspapers primarily publish 
hard news (news dealing with serious topics or events) and/or investigative 
articles. The identified newspapers were available at the researcher’s work 
library and were accessible to the researcher at all times.  
 
It follows that by focusing only on published news articles, the research was 
limited only to secondary data. Three types of news items that were 
considered for analysis were news, editorial and feature articles. Due to the 
prescribed short time allocated for the research, the study considered only 
articles published from 02 January 2014 to 31 December 2014. Monitoring 
was conducted from Sundays, to include investigative articles and breaking 
news, and proceeded to Fridays to monitor follow-up and related articles 
during the week. Six days of the week were an attempt to address the issue 
of representativeness. 
 
The sampling method chosen, like other qualitative strategy sampling 
methods, is limited in that it is a non-probability sampling and therefore 
cannot be generalised. However, this concern is mitigated by the fact that a 
large sample of selected newspapers relative to the South African national 
newspapers was selected. 
 
Collected data was supplemented with interviews conducted with journalists 
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and other relevant stakeholders. In this regard three journalists) who covered 
the issue, a Right2Know organiser and two senior counter intelligence 
officials of the State Security Agency (SSA) were interviewed. Interviews with 
all the journalists and the Right2Know member were conducted 
telephonically while interviews with SSA members were conducted in person. 
Interviews were semi-structured to allow flexibility and follow-up questions. 
Participants were given option whether they want their names to be disclosed 
or remain confidential and all, but one journalist preferred that they names be 
disclosed. Participated journalists were selected based on the quantity of 
news articles they wrote about the alleged spy satellite. In other words, those 
who wrote more than one articles were given preference. SSA officials were 
chosen on the basis of seniority and experience related to counter 
intelligence. Furthermore, the organiser of Right2Known was the most 
suitable person to interview because she is responsible for raising public 
awareness against perceived abuse of security legislation. The 
Right2Known, a non-governmental organisation, was purposively selected 
because it is an advocacy organisation which seeks “to ensure the free flow 
of information necessary to meet people’s social, economic, political and 
ecological needs.” 
 
3.4  Data validation 
The methodology employed addressed the issues of reliability which relates 
to consistency of the measure, and validity, which relates to the integrity of 
the findings from the data. Data was collected from the majority of national 
newspapers ranging from daily to weekly newspapers. This, coupled with the 
fact that data was collected directly from the source reflecting information at 
the time of publication, helped to enhance the reliability of the data. Related 
to this was that the proposed data collection method was unobtrusive and 
thus errors resulting from the interaction between researchers and research 
participants were eliminated. The issue of validity in this regard was to a 
larger extent addressed by the utilisation of a range of newspapers, which 
lends credence to the possible generalisation of the findings.  
 
However, it should be noted that the aim of analysis relates to the 
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examination of the extent and nature of reporting on issues relating to 
national security and not the objectivity and accuracy of the data. Thus the 
credibility and validity of the data in this regard was not necessarily of 
significant value.  
 
3.5  Data analysis  
The processing of data was preceded by an overview of relevant news 
articles published within the said focus period. There are few well-established 
and widely accepted rules for analysis of qualitative data.  
 
The determination whether published newspaper articles have harmed or 
have the potential to harm national security can be appropriately and properly 
adjudicated by the courts. Therefore the interpretation of the findings of this 
study was made based on the researcher’s lay and possible subjective view 
of what the researcher could perceive as prejudicial to national security or 
suppression of press freedom. This was done by taking into cognisance that 
national security in South Africa is defined in broad terms. 
 
Furthermore, South Africa has a liberal constitutional framework that 
guarantees freedom of the press and related liberties, such as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and the right of access to information. It 
follows that the analysis of selected articles was done within the context of 
these constitutional provisions, including PAIA, as well as the libertarian 
press theory on one hand, and the country’s legal framework including 
relevant security legislation concerning limitation of the right to freedom of 
expression, on the other hand. These set of clauses served as tools for 
determining whether the content of the analysed articles was interpreted to 
have compromised or had the potential to compromise national security. The 
determination of whether the disclosure benefited citizens more than harm it 
caused to national security was ultimately a personal judgement. It is worth 
noting that despite the existence of legal framework relating to the right to 
know and national security considerations, there is policy ambiguity in terms 
of guidelines to justify why certain information should be protected, for 
example, which security interest are under what threat (Africa, 2009).  
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3.6  Limitations of the research  
The study was limited only to newspapers in an attempt to bring the study to 
a manageable size considering academic prescription in terms of time and 
scope of the study. By excluding electronic media, such as radio, TV and 
other forms of print media, the study is deficient as most probably excluded 
relevant information that could have enriched the analysis of this case study. 
Similarly the exclusive focus on English language newspapers at the 
expense of the other official languages could have deprived the study of 
valuable data. Limiting of the case study to a 12-month period may also 
exclude relevant data that could have impact on the finding and, thus, its 
interpretation.  
 
It also worth noting that unlike in the case of quantitative analysis, the 
interpretation of data in this study could have been affected by possible 
subjectivity and bias of the researcher. Another limitation related to this 
analysis was the lack of analyses methods within the qualitative research 
framework. Currently there are few well-developed and generally accepted 
analysis rules that can be used in qualitative research. 
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Chapter 4: Presentation of research findings 
 
Consolidated Project Flute Case Study 
Since the dawn of democracy, the government has been consistent in 
accusing the local press of not being patriotic and disregarding national 
security interests when reporting. At the same time, the press as well, 
harbours some misgivings about the government and criticises the 
government that it hides behind secrecy to cover corruption. Despite 
government criticism of the press for not being sensitive when reporting on, 
among others, issues relating to national security interests, the local press 
has never shied away from reporting on government's secret projects. It is 
not surprising that the approach of the press on the reported acquisition of a 
military satellite reportedly code named Consolidated Project Flute is no 
different. The reporting on this project occurred against the backdrop of a 
democratic South African government that had never taken legal action 
against the press for disclosing state secrets or classified information.  
 
The reported existence of a defence intelligence satellite was carried by the 
Sunday Times on 19 January 2014. However, the first disclosure was made 
by the Mail & Guardian in September 2008. Newspapers reports on 
Consolidated Project Flute started gaining currency in 2014 and the issue 
was widely covered in the press. The local press reported on the issue 
throughout 2014. Some of the Russian media also published follow-up 
reports on the satellite. This highlights challenges that global information 
technology advancement poses to domestic state information security laws. 
The DOD reportedly entered into a contract (ref number 710/03/060001) with 
the Russian company, NPO Mashinostroyenia, for the development of a 
Kondor-E spy satellite for Defence Intelligence on 19 May 2006.  
 
The contract, as well as the existence of a military satellite project, was later 
confirmed by two senior state officials. On 22 October 2014, Secretary of 
Defence and Military Veterans Sam Gulube told the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Defence and Military Veterans that a contract signed on 19 
May 2006 to develop a military satellite, which was at some stage cancelled 
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and then reinstated, was on track. Prior to this, in February 2014, Auditor-
General Kimi Makwetu furnished David Maynier, Democratic Alliance (DA) 
Member of Parliament (MP), a copy of the Auditor-General's report on the 
special defence account (SDA) which referred to a sensitive project 
commissioned to a foreign company. Maynier received the said by virtue of 
him being member of the Joint Standing Committee on. The SDA augments 
the account which was established, in terms of section 2(1) (a) of the 
Defence Special Account Act, 1974 (Act No.6 of 1974) for financing special 
defence activities and purchases. The account is secret and its access is 
limited to members of Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence 
and security cleared officials of the Office of the Auditor General.  
 
As is often the case when there is media disclosure of government secret 
projects, the publication of news articles on the military satellite was met with 
resentment from the government. The Minister of Defence and Military 
Veterans, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, has to date refused to confirm or refute 
the existence of such a spy satellite project.  
On 23 January 2014 City Press stated that Mapisa-Nqakula was dismayed at 
attempts by those whom she said seemed to want to undermine the security 
of the country and questioned whose interests they served. Former ministers 
of defence, as well, denied any knowledge of the project. Similarly, the 
Department of Defence (DOD), the State Security Agency and the 
Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) refused to 
answer questions about the project. However, the Sunday Times reported on 
19 January 2014 that the 2008 annual report of the JSCI stated that the latter 
received a briefing on Consolidated Project Flute from Defence Intelligence. 
This statement confirms the existence of the said project in the DOD. In the 
same article the paper revealed the contents of a letter dated 19 August 2011 
from the then Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Lindiwe Sisulu, 
addressed to the Minister of Science and Technology (DST), Naledi Pandor, 
in which she raised concerns about the satellite contract which stated that it 
had been transferred to the DST. In the letter, Sisulu also stated that the 
contract was entered into by the then Minister of Defence Mosiuoa Lekota. 
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The Democratic Alliance, the official opposition party, expressed concern 
over the implications that the satellite would have on the privacy of the South 
African citizens and that it appeared that South Africa would not have control 
of the satellite. Maynier, DA Member of Parliament, reportedly stated that “we 
also need to get to the bottom of whether there is a reconnaissance satellite 
in space and, if so, who has control over the product and what systems are in 
place to protect South African citizens’ privacy”  
 
Since the disclosure of the project, the DOD has neither refuted nor 
confirmed newspapers reports on the existence of such a satellite and said 
that projects related to defence intelligence were classified because these 
impacted on the national security of South Africa. The stance adopted by the 
DOD in respect of Consolidated Project Flute is informed by a number of 
South African laws which prohibit disclosure of sensitive or classified 
information relating to the national security of the country: 
• Section 4 of the Protection of Information Act, 1982 (Act No. 84 of 
1982), as amended, on prohibition of disclosure of certain information; 
• Section 104 (7) Defence Act, 2002 (Act No. 42 of 2002) on offences 
and penalties; 
• Section 41 of Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No. 2 
of 2000 on defence, security and international relations of the 
Republic; and 
• The MISS Policy is a document that sets a minimum standard for 
handling of classified information in all state institutions 
(http://www.gov.za/documents). 
The aforementioned sections criminalise unauthorised disclosure of classified 
information and contraventions of these sections can be prosecuted in court 
of law.  
 
The press coverage of the said military satellite was wide-ranging and 
included the type, value, capabilities, supplier and the date of the launch of 
the satellite. On 19 January 2014, the Sunday Times reported on the 
unknown whereabouts of a R1.2 billion spy satellite commissioned by South 
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Africa from a Russian company. The Sunday Times further revealed that the 
DOD transferred the project to the Department of Technology in 2011 
following the freezing of the satellite contract in the 2006-07 financial year by 
the DOD. A number of local newspapers also reported that the DOD had 
committed R1.2bn to the project to acquire a Kondor-E satellite. The satellite 
(a Kondor-E) is reportedly of a type often, but not exclusively, used for 
spying.  
 
On 17 December 2014, the Citizen carried an article on a report about the 
Kondor-E satellite published on the Russian news site 
www.russianspaceweb.com. The report stated that South African Defence 
Intelligence "planned to use the satellite for various surveillance goals, 
including battlefield reconnaissance". The report also speculated that the 
possible ground station to monitor the satellite in South Africa could be at the 
SA National Space Agency's Hartesbeeshoek facility, or the Overberg Test 
Range near Arniston, operated by Denel.  
 
On the strengths and weaknesses of the satellite, press reports stated that 
the satellite would place SA in a position to conduct its own aerial 
surveillance in Africa, potentially up to Israel, and capable of collecting radar 
images at night and through cloud cover of objects as small as cars. On the 
downside, on 27 October 2014, the Business Day carried comments by 
defence expert Helmoed-Romer Heitman on the weaknesses of Kondor-E 
satellite. Heitman was reported to have said that the satellite was not 
permanently on station and its area of regard was very small at 10km times 
20km, which would make it easy to miss something in a large area of 
operations. Heitman added that the type of satellite would have a life span of 
three to five years. 
 
The newspapers also reported that a Kondor-E satellite (not known if it is for 
the SANDF Defence Intelligence) was launched from the Biakonur 
Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, Russia, on 19 December 2014. According to 
press reports, previous scheduled launches were postponed for several 
times (19 December 2014, 30 September 2014, end of June 2014 and 19 
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March 2014) for undisclosed reasons.  
 
Rationale for coverage 
To put the analysis of the published articles in its proper context, the motives 
and intentions of the journalists should be considered. The analysis of the 
published articles would be skewed if the journalists' intentions in writing the 
articles are not taken into consideration. Reasons for publishing the articles 
by the relevant journalists interviewed ranges from informing citizens to 
exposing corruption. 
 
The quest for truth-telling and informing citizens how their tax money was 
being spent were the main reasons behind the disclosure by some of the 
interviewed journalists. However, one journalist expressed that his motive for 
writing the article was not only to inform the public, but also an attempt to 
expose suspected corrupt practices and procurement irregularities involved 
in acquiring the reported military spy satellite. Suspicions exist that there 
were irregularities involved in the procurement deal of the alleged spy 
satellite and that it was for this reason that the deal was reportedly 
temporarily canceled. Suspicions were also fueled by questions around the 
then head of Defence Intelligence Lieutenant General ‘Mojo’ Motau believed 
to have been the main driver behind the project, if he had the authority to do 
so. The JSCI reportedly also investigated the suspected irregularities. Motau 
is now retired. The journalist stated the endeavors to uncover suspected 
corruption or irregularities failed due to lack of access to relevant supply 
chain information because the information was classified. 
 
All the interviewed journalists were strongly convinced that they had not 
contravened any information protection legislation hence the DOD did not 
charge them. They further said that none of the journalists was reported to 
the Press Ombudsman for reporting on the issue, which could serve as 
confirmation that they violated no rule. They were of the opinion that the 
public interest in the reported spy satellite was greater than the national 
security consideration. Mr Stefaans Brummer, senior investigative journalist 
with Amabungane, formerly with the Mail & Guardian , said: “One has to ask 
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how bad will it be if other countries know South Africa has a spy satellite 
versus how good will it be if people know of the corruption involved in 
acquiring the satellite” (Interview, 2 June 2016). According to Brummer, all 
the information covered in his articles was already in the public domain. 
 
All the journalists who participated in the research said that they were free to 
do their work in South Africa. However, one journalist stated that the gains 
that have been made, since 1994, in terms of journalist’s rights to report 
freely were being slowly eroded. The journalist provided examples of 
challenges facing journalists at the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC). Contrary to accusations, particularly from government, some 
journalists expressed their patriotism for South Africa in that they carefully 
thought about the potential impact a piece of information could have to the 
country should it be published. These journalists further claimed that they 
knew the perimeters of freedom of the press when issues pertaining to 
national security were concerned. However, one journalist indicated that it 
was only after the approval of POSIB that the country had the clearest 
information protection statutory instrument of what government regarded as 
contravention of information protection legislation.  
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Chapter 5: Presentation and Analysis of findings  
 
Before an argument for secrecy and transparency is advanced, a general 
analysis of the findings shows that the press coverage of this issue was wide-
ranging. The coverage included issues relating to the contract, parties to the 
contract, monetary value of the project, description and technical capabilities 
of the reported spy satellite and the satellite launch date. It can be concluded 
that the coverage of this issue was not limited to particular aspects of the 
alleged acquisition, but covered as much information as possible concerning 
the project. For example, the news articles included details such as, strategic 
purpose for the satellite and focus areas of information collection and the 
date of launch. Is this type of press coverage of a security-related issue likely 
to cause harm to national security or is it in the public interest? The following 
sections will attempt to answer this question. 
 
A case for secrecy 
Does the Defence Intelligence spy satellite project need to be kept secret? 
An attempt at answering this question should be guided by the South African 
legal framework pertaining to national security, particularly information 
security. 
 
According to section 4 of the Protection of Information Act, 1982 (Act No. 84 
of 1982), any person who has in his or her possession or under his/her 
control or at his/her disposal any document, model, article or information 
which he knows or reasonably should know is kept, used, made or obtained 
in a prohibited place or relates to a prohibited place, anything in a prohibited 
place, armaments, the defence of the Republic, a military matter, a security 
matter or the prevention or combating of terrorism; which has been made, 
obtained or received in contravention of the Protection of Information Act, 
1982; and who publishes or uses such document or information in any 
manner or for any purpose which is prejudicial to the security or interests of 
the Republic, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine 
not exceeding R10 000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 
years or to both a fine and a term of imprisonment. 
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On one hand it seems that the publishing of information on Consolidated 
Project Flute contravened the Information Protection Act, 1982, particularly in 
respect of defence of the Republic, and military and security matters. Press 
reports disclosed that the satellite was intended to collect intelligence across 
the African continent for the purpose of enhancing capacity and capabilities 
the in Africa. 
 
Another legal instrument that protects information specifically in respect of 
the SANDF is the Defence Act, 2002 (Act No. 42 of 2002). Section 104 (7) of 
the Act states that, subject to the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 
2000 (Act No. 2 of 2000), any person who, without authority, discloses or 
publishes any information, or is responsible for such disclosure or 
publication, whether by print, the electronic media, verbally or by gesture, 
where such information has been classified in terms of this Act, is guilty of an 
offence and liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding five years. 
 
Consistent with the Protection of Information Act, the Defence Act prohibits 
the disclosure or publication of information in the possession of the SANDF, 
classified in terms of this Act. According to section 104 of the Act, the 
disclosure or publication of classified information is an offence. This section 
of the Act seems to not consider the merit of the nature of the information 
which is classified. In this respect the content and nature of the information in 
terms of perceived sensitivity pertaining to the military and national security 
seem to be immaterial. This raises the question of information classification 
capacity in the DOD: are the SANDF personnel responsible for classifying 
information suitably qualified to properly classify information? As already 
mentioned elsewhere in this paper, there is lack of clear criteria and proper 
oversight on the classification process within the South African public service 
which possibly results in information being routinely and thus erroneously 
classified.  
 
Notwithstanding the deficiencies in the classification process of the DOD, 
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newspapers which disclosed information on the reported military spy satellite 
seem to have contravened the Defence Act. This is so because Section 104 
(7) of the Act states that any person who, without authority, discloses or 
publishes any information classified in terms of the Defence Act is guilty of an 
offence. 
 
The case for information protection is further strengthened by the Promotion 
of Access to Information Act, 2000 (PAIA). Section 41 of this Act stipulates 
that access to information can be restricted based on confidentiality of 
information such as methods of, and scientific or technical equipment for 
collecting, assessing or handling information for intelligence purposes. This 
includes intelligence relating to the defence of the Republic; and the 
detection, prevention, suppression or curtailment of subversive or hostile 
activities.  
 
The clearest pronouncement on state information not to be disclosed to 
unauthorised persons, which is closely related to this case study, is stipulated 
in section 41 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000. Section 41 
of this Act specifically restricts or protects information pertaining to equipment 
for gathering intelligence. The press coverage of the alleged SANDF Defence 
Intelligence satellite was to the extent that both the nature and the 
capabilities of the satellite were disclosed. 
 
In the light of the above, it can be argued that the newspaper reports on this 
issue seem to have contravened the South African security legislation in 
three respects. The first contravention relates to possession of classified 
information belonging to the DOD. In as far as section 4 of the Act 
(Information Protection Act, 1982) is concerned, being in possession of 
classified information related to the defence or security of the country without 
authorisation is already an offence irrespective of whether the information is 
disclosed or published. Therefore possession of this information by involved 
journalists is apparently illegal as the journalists in question have not been 
authorised to keep such information or documents. It is not known where and 
how journalists accessed the classified information. It would be worthy to 
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know how the information or document/s left the custody of the DOD. 
However, this is immaterial in respect of the context of this case study. 
 
Second, the publishing or disclosure of any classified information is 
considered an offence in terms of the Information Protection Act. The Act 
prohibits an unauthorised accessing or possession and publishing of 
document or information related to military and security matters. The 
published information on the military satellite is related to military and security 
matters. Defence Intelligence produces intelligence to support military 
operations. This means that the utilisation of the satellite in question can be 
regarded as a military matter. Similarly, it can be regarded as a security issue 
because it is a security measure instituted not only to enhance the security of 
the army itself, but the country as well. It follows therefore that publishing of 
such information can be prejudicial to the national security or interests of 
South Africa. 
 
Third, according to Section 41 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 
2000, the disclosure of information specifically related to intelligence 
gathering methods, processing and handling is prohibited in South Africa. 
 
The DOD has a duty not only to protect the Republic of South Africa, but to 
protect sensitive state information in its possession. Unauthorised disclosure 
of classified information is a offence as stipulated in aforementioned security 
laws and can be prosecuted in a court of law. In the light of the above 
background, it can be argued that it is within the right of the DOD to take 
legal action on the grounds of national security against any person who 
discloses or publishes classified information.  
 
Despite the seemingly convincing evidence suggesting contravention of the 
information protection legislation, why did the DOD not charge journalists 
responsible for publishing security sensitive information? Could it be that the 
DOD did not want to be seen to be persecuting journalists, which could be 
perceived as disregarding press freedom? Or was it because the DOD was 
not sure of the prospects of such cases? 
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Surely there must be some rationale why the DOD and government in 
general was reluctant to take legal action against the press when the later 
contravened security legislation. One of the reasons could be concerns about 
the constitutional standing of the legislation pertaining to protection of 
information. For example, a review of the Protection of Information Act, 1982, 
reveals that the Act is outdated because it contains some provisions that are 
contrary to the Constitution and other legislation relating to handling of 
information in that it contains legal presumptions which are deemed to be 
unconstitutional. It also does not provide sufficient protection for the state 
against information peddlers and current trends concerning espionage. It is 
deficient in many respects, more specifically it contains unconstitutional 
provisions relating to presumptions: it does not cater for relevant offences 
and minimum sentences, and does not provide for criteria relating to state 
information before the courts. These deficiencies will be addressed when the 
Act is repealed and replaced by the proposed Protection of State Information 
Act.  
 
Another reason could be that the DOD is concerned that should it take a 
legal route it would expose itself in the process. Challenging the publishing of 
information in court would have given credence to the newspaper reports 
thereby confirming that it indeed has acquired the reported spy satellite. Thus 
the decision to lay criminal charges against implicated journalists would have 
advantaged the adversaries of SANDF in terms of its peace keeping mission, 
by providing them more information emanating from court arguments thereby 
confirming the existence of the alleged satellite. The actual existence of 
corruption involved in the reported procurement of spy satellite could also be 
the real reason why the government did not lay criminal charges. 
 
It is worth noting that even in the event where the local press refrained from 
publishing information on the Defence Intelligence satellite the efficacy of the 
domestic statutory secrecy regimes would had been negated by the nature of 
technologically linked global media system. In this regard a Russian news 
site www.russianspaceweb.com reported on the intended use and possible 
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ground station from which the said satellite will be monitored.  
 
A case for transparency 
On the other hand, an argument can be made that by publishing information 
on the alleged acquisition of the spy satellite, the press was simply in pursuit 
of transparency of governance and to inform the public. Transparency is 
about shedding light on rules, plans, processes and actions thereby ensuring 
that public officials, civil servants, managers, board members and 
businesspeople act visibly and understandably, and report on their activities 
(http://www.transparency.org/topic/).Transparency in a liberal democracy 
puts government under an obligation to share information with citizens 
(http://www.oecd.org/fr/apropos/). In this way transparency helps increase 
trust in government and its institutions.  
One of the objectives of the local press as expressed in the press code is to 
inform citizens to enable them to make informed judgments and hold public 
officials accountable. Chapter 2, section 16 (1) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act, 1996, guarantees freedom of expression and 
also makes provision for the right of the public to access official information 
through PAIA. Section 32.1 of the Constitution states that every person has 
the right of access to any information held by the state. But, as already 
stated, rights are not absolute. Therefore, government is legally authorised to 
protect sensitive information in the custody of its entities from disclosure or 
unauthorised access. The question arises as to when the disclosure of 
information is justifiable. 
 
The need for transparent governance is strongly advocated by the South 
African advocacy group, Right2Know. The Right2Know expressed its mission 
as to seek a country and a world free to access and to share information. 
One of the principles of this organisation states that transparency, achieved 
through the right to know, holds power to account so that political, social, 
economic and environmental justice is realised. 
 
Alex Hotz, the Right2Know secrecy organiser, stated that the Right2Know 
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supported the publishing of news articles by the press irrespective of national 
security concerns. Hotz stated that her organisation had problems with the 
legal provision that allowed the South African government to keep certain 
information secret on the grounds of national security because government 
abused such legal provisions. Furthermore, Hotz claimed that the 
government used the secrecy right to securitise issues beyond the legal 
framework of what concerns national security. “The project for upgrading the 
private residence of President Zuma at Inkandla serves as a good example 
of the abuse of security legislation to cover-up something that has nothing to 
do with security. To avoid such cover-ups, government should not be 
permitted to withhold information from the public even if the information 
concerns national security matter,’' Hotz said.  
 
On the issue of press disclosure of information about the reported SANDF 
spy satellite, Hotz stated that Right2Know fully supported the publishing of 
such news articles for transparency reasons. In addition, Hotz raised concern 
over secrecy around such acquisitions in that such a satellite could also be 
used to monitor and monitor activists perceived to be hostile to government 
(interview with Alex Hotz, 15 June 2016). In raising issues concerning privacy 
of individuals, the Right2Know share the same concerns with the DA, which 
also asked questions about privacy of citizens. 
 
The analysis and conclusion on the nature of reporting by the South African 
press would be incomplete if cognizance was not taken of the premise from 
which it (press) operated. As already mentioned in literature review section, 
the local press is more inclined to the libertarian theory. Therefore, its 
approach to news reporting is informed by the idea that individuals, including 
newspapers, should be free to publish anything they like, as long as it does 
not infringe on the freedom of others. These values are also enshrined in the 
Constitution of the Republic. The constitutional provision for freedom of 
expression, including freedom of the press, together with libertarian theory 
principles, will be a proper framework within which to analyse the approach of 
the press when it comes to security issues.  
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The motives behind the publication of information on the military satellite 
range from the need to inform the public to the need to expose government 
irregularities. The basis for publishing information on the grounds to inform or 
expose irregularities, such as corruption is necessitated by public interest, 
which is also supported by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
Chapter 2, section 16 (1) of the Constitution guarantees freedom of 
expression and also makes provision for the right of the public to access 
state information through PAIA.  
 
The importance of freedom of the press as a component of freedom of 
expression has also been explicitly recognised by the Constitutional Court 
and other courts in South Africa. For instance, in Khumalo v Holomisa 2 the 
Constitutional Court stated as follows: 
“The print, broadcast and electronic media have a particular role in the 
protection of freedom of expression in our society. Every citizen has the right 
to freedom of the press and the media and the right to receive information 
and ideas. The media are key agents in ensuring that these aspects of the 
rights to freedom of information are respected” (http://bccsa.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Case-No-47-2006.pdf). 
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Chapter 6: Interpretation of findings  
 
The disclosure of information relating to the reported procumbent contract 
number and a ministerial letter about the transfer of the project from DOD to 
the DST also showed that the press had published classified information 
because government documents such as these are always classified. The 
presumed contravention in this regard should be viewed in the context that 
the journalists published classified information without making a request for 
permission to access it as in terms of the PAIA prescripts. In other words, this 
assessment is not based on merit that the disclosed information deserves 
protection, but on mere observation that permission was not sought prior to 
publication. 
 
Both the case for secrecy on the one hand and the case for transparency on 
the other hand have merit and are both supported by South African 
legislation. Secrecy is necessary in cases where the government sees the 
need to protect certain information that, if disclosed to unauthorised people, 
can compromise national security or the territorial integrity of the state. But 
equally important, government transparency is necessary to give citizens 
right of access to information on government activities to enable citizens to 
make informed decisions. What is clear in this case is that some of the 
information published by newspapers was classified according to the DOD. 
What needs to be determined is the extent, to which the published 
information on Consolidated Project Flute compromised or undermined 
national security, if any at all. At the same time impact on national security 
should be weighed against the public interest in the reported Defence 
Intelligence project. In determining this, consideration should be made on the 
importance of balancing the need for state secrecy on the grounds of national 
security and, transparency and public interest. 
 
Even if the case of unauthorised disclosure by the press may seem to be 
obvious, it can be argued that not all of the published information warranted 
protection anymore at the time of publication. For instance, information 
related to the existence of Consolidated Project Flute within SANDF and the 
need to enhance Defence Intelligence collection capability was already 
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disclosed in the JSCI annual report of 2009. Furthermore some of the details 
around the reported acquisition of a spy satellite by DOD were published by a 
Russian news site which is not subject to South African security legislation. 
The site, www.russianspaceweb.com, published a report on Kondor-E titled 
"Russia orbit South-Africa's first spy satellite" in December 2014.  
 
Second, in a similar but unrelated case, in the case between the CCII 
systems (Pty) Ltd and DOD, which shares similarities to this case study, a 
High Court judge, Justice Southwood, ruled in 2002 in favour of CCII systems 
(Pty) Ltd to be granted access to information held by the DOD. CCII systems 
was involved in supply of computer and software systems for the defence 
industry and was requesting “certain records pertaining to the subsystems to 
be installed on corvettes ordered by the DOD for use by the South African 
Navy”. The company claimed that it has been wrongly excluded from the 
tender process and therefore wanted the records for the purpose of instituting 
a lawsuit for damages against the minister of defence, the Armaments 
Corporation of South Africa Limited (Armscor), and African Defence Systems 
(Pty) Ltd.  
 
The Southwood judgment serves as an important lesson that classification 
status designated to information or documents alone cannot be used as 
justification to deny access to state information. Instead of a simple refusal to 
disclose information, the entity withholding information should present legally 
sound argument indicating specific likely harm that the disclosure would 
result. Similarly, the onus is on the entity laying criminal charges relating to 
unauthorised disclosure to show harm caused by disclosure relative to public 
interest in the information in question. In other words it is not sufficient to 
invoke sections 36, 37 and 41 of PAIA, which respectively provide for refusal 
on the basis of containing confidential commercial information, or confidential 
third party information or that disclosure could reasonably be expected to 
cause harm to the defence and security of the Republic. 
 
However, the circumstances/dynamics around the CCII Systems and 
Consolidated Project Flute are not the same. The CCII Systems case 
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pertains to request for access to classified information while Consolidated 
Project Flute issue involves unauthorised publication which according to PAIA 
is regarded as a criminal offence. Despite this difference, the similarity in the 
two cases is that both involve classified information in possession of the 
DOD. This means that although these two cases should be treated on their 
merits, Justice Southwood’s ruling may have a bearing on the disclosure of 
information about the alleged spy satellite. 
 
Although the question of whether the publication of the articles was in 
contravention of the information protection legislation cannot be fairly 
determined outside a court of law, what can be determined is the impact of 
the articles on national security. However, it is difficult if not impossible to 
accurately measure the damage done to national security due to the 
disclosure or leaks. In some cases the harm can be significant and the public 
benefit small while in other cases the harm can be small and the public 
interest significant. In addition, harm can range from tangible to intangible 
and from imminent to long term. The disclosure in this case could have 
impacted negatively on national security or had the potential to harm national 
security.  
 
The actual or real impact for publishing the information on the reported 
military spy satellite does not form part this analysis. The actual impact on 
national security in general, and SANDF and its Defence Intelligence division 
in particular could not be solicited from the DOD due to the fact that other 
than acknowledging the existence of Consolidated Project Flute, the DOD 
has so far not confirmed that it acquired the satellite in question. This 
confirms the sensitivity with which the DOD treats issues of this nature. The 
lack of knowledge about the extent of actual harm caused to national security 
will even make it more difficult to determine if the disclosure caused more 
costs than benefits to the country. 
 
The press and media in general are becoming increasingly a major open 
source for intelligence information. It is widely believed that up to 95 percent 
of intelligence worldwide is produced from open source information. While 
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the intention of publishing the information could have been to inform the 
public on the reported military spy satellite, foreign intelligence services 
would certainly have found the information interesting and useful. Such 
information could have advantaged competitors or rivals of South Africa by 
helping them to develop countermeasures to impede satellite intelligence 
collection efforts.  
The disclosure of the technical information, for example, regarding the 
reported capacity and capability in terms of strengths and weaknesses of the 
satellite would potentially render the SANDF vulnerable and compromise the 
strategic information collection capability of the Defence Intelligence to some 
extent. The disclosure specifically exposes and undermines the defence 
strategy of SANDF concerning the rest of the continent. Furthermore, the 
disclosed total cost of the reported spy satellite is likely to have compromised 
the special defence account (SDA) by exposing it. This could have benefited 
the strategic planning of the competitors or rivals of SANDF. To avoid risks 
such as these provides some of the reasons why governments restrict public 
access to such information, even shielding it from parliamentary scrutiny.  
Another concern relates to the reported disclosure of the launch date. This 
had possibly given the competitors in the airborne information gathering 
technology space advantage over the SANDF and thus South Africa. Finally, 
the disclosure could have possibly compromised the finalisation of the 
reported procurement process.  
In the light of the above it is argued that by publishing information on the 
reported military spy satellite acquisition had possibly prejudiced not only the 
SANDF but also South Africa’s national security. Disclosures and leaks of this 
nature cannot always be regarded as of no consequence to national security 
as is often argued by transparency proponents who accuse governments of 
broadly and unnecessarily over-classifying information. The following serves 
as an example of how disclosure of this type can affect security operations:   
A New York Times story on 31 January 1958 reported that the United States 
was able to monitor the eight-hour countdown broadcasts for Soviet missile 
launches (Soviet ICBM testing) from Baykonur formerly Tyuratam, 
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Kazakhstan, which provided enough lead time to dispatch US aircraft to 
observe the splashdowns and, thus, collect data used to estimate the 
accuracy of the intercontinental ballistic missiles. Following publication of the 
article, Moscow cut the countdown broadcasts to four hours, too little time for 
US aircraft to reach the landing area. Occurring in the midst of the missile-
gap controversy, the publication of the press item left President Eisenhower 
angry, according to Wayne Jackson in Allen Welsh Dulles, Director of Central 
Intelligence (July 1973, declassified history, Volume IV, pp. 29-31, in Record 
Group 263, National Archives). According to the same source, some 
intelligence was lost forever, and, to recoup the remainder, the US Air Force 
had to rebuild an Alaskan airfield at a cost of millions of dollars. 
However, it should be borne in mind that withholding information about 
spending on key security procurement projects, such as military and 
intelligence is virtually impossible as competitors and rival countries can use 
other methods to get such information. Media, in particular, are increasingly 
used by intelligence services as source of openly available information for 
intelligence purposes. The same can also be said about maintaining state 
secrets in general. Hence governments can only achieve partial secrecy 
instead of complete secrecy. This raises concerns over the effectiveness of 
information protection laws in this era of advancing information technology. 
 
The presumed prejudice to national security due to the press disclosure 
should also be balanced against the public’s right to know. There is need to 
balance the risks of security information disclosure against the benefits of 
informing citizens of how their tax money is being utilised. Notwithstanding 
that the press published classified security information without authorisation, 
the disclosure helped to inform the public about reported procurement deal. 
Defence armaments procurement deals pose corruption risks as such deals 
more are often reportedly associated with bribery scandals.  
 
The publishing of such information ensures transparency, which serves 
several objectives relating to democratic oversight, resource allocation and 
assist citizen to hold government accountable. Section 192 (1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states that public administration 
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must be accountable and transparency must be fostered by providing the 
public with timely, accessible and accurate information. The disclosure of 
information such as this enables the public to monitor spending to guard 
against irregular, wasteful expenditure and misuse of state funds. As already 
stated elsewhere in this paper, the purpose of publishing the information for 
one of the journalists, for example, was to expose suspected corruption 
involved in the alleged acquisition deal. Related to this is the concern raised 
by the DA that the reported satellite would not be under the control of the 
South African government. Corruption can thrive if all information on 
procurements such as this is withheld from the public. Another benefit of 
publishing this information relates to the right of privacy. Some of the news 
articles raised concerns over the implications of the reported spy satellite 
regarding the privacy of South African citizens.  
 
Transparency can help prevent corruption in a range of areas, such as 
defence and security, public procurement, public institutions, politics and 
government, judiciary, oil and gas, etc. The challenge lies in finding the 
balance between secrecy and transparency. In a developing country like 
South Africa, citizens would want to know how their limited resources are 
being utilised. 
 
The interpretation of the existing legal framework which provides for both 
rights, to keep certain information secret and to allow access to state 
information, seems to be polarised. Both government and the press accuse 
each other of abusing their legitimate right to protect information and to 
access information respectively. During the interview with the journalists the 
issue of interpretation of information security legislation clearly came to the 
fore when journalists claimed to understand the law and that their reports did 
not infringe the law.   
 
Although concerns with information protection legislation were not a major 
issue during the interview with the journalists, current information protection 
legislation, specifically the Information Act (1982), has some deficiencies. 
The Act has been criticised for making unqualified incursions into freedom of 
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speech and the right of access to information. Section 4(1) of the Act 
prohibits disclosure of any information which the discloser knows or 
reasonably ought to know should remain secret for the “security or other 
interests of the Republic”. The Act does not provide clarity on what type of 
information should be regarded as relevant to security or other interests of 
the Republic. The other concern is that the Act is open to abuse where any 
information can be regarded as security information and that it (Act) applies 
blanket restrictions on disclosure, which works against transparency. 
  
The POSIB is envisaged to replace and address the deficiencies of the 
Information Protection Act (1982) when enacted into law. However, the 
POSIB itself raised new concerns as transparency and freedom of 
expression advocacy groups and opposition political parties expressed their 
unhappiness with the Bill. Critics of the Bill argue that POSIB does not 
correctly balance the need for secrecy and openness. They say that the Bill 
undermine the right to access information and the rights of whistleblowers 
and journalists. The POSIB regards as espionage and hostile criminal activity 
for communicating classified information which a person “knows or ought 
reasonably to have known would directly or indirectly benefit” a foreign state 
or non-state actor or prejudice national security. Critics raise concerns that 
this stipulations are too broad that they could apply to legitimate 
whistleblowers and anyone else exposing classified information in the public 
domain. 
 
This shows that arriving at a common understanding of what needs to be 
kept secret on the grounds of national security and to what extent the 
government should be transparent on issues relating to national security 
seems to be a challenging task. This calls for government, media, civil 
society and other stakeholders to come together in attempt to answer the 
following questions:  
Is the need to protect certain sensitive (including national security information 
and trade secrets) bad for citizens? Can the level of secrecy around defence, 
intelligence and other key state entities be reduced without prejudicing 
national security? In instances where the disclosure of information may both 
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cost and benefit the nation, which should take precedence? What rights do 
citizens have to the information collected about them on suspicion of being 
involved in illegal activities? Will it benefit citizens more than cause harm to 
national security when sensitive information relating to investigation on 
suspected dangerous criminals, such as syndicate members or terrorists, is 
made public? Is the secrecy accorded to security services proportionate to 
potential threats to South Africa?  Answers to these questions could assist to 
find an appropriate balance between national security concerns and 
transparency could help reduce the tension between government and the 
press. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Tension between governments and the private press, which result from a 
different understanding of the statutory provisions for state secrecy and 
freedom of expression, is a common feature in democratic and non-
democratic states worldwide. The Consolidated Project Flute case study 
reflects existing tension that has characterised the South African government 
and press relations since the dawn of democracy pertaining to competing 
interests between national security needs and the free flow of information in a 
democracy.  
 
The post-apartheid government wants a press that is free but responsible 
and sensitive when reporting on matters relating to national security. On the 
other hand the South African private press, which is more inclined to liberal 
values, insists on reporting freely without government interference and 
control. This tension emanates from the apparent failure by government and 
the press to find a proper balance between the legal authority of government 
to keep certain information secret and press freedom to access and publish 
information that it deems to be in the public interest. 
 
The findings of this study are not conclusive on whether the local press is 
indifferent about national security interests when reporting. The inference is 
made that the unauthorised publication of classified information possibly 
harmed national security is arguably countered, to some extent, by the 
expressed intention of the journalists to uncover suspected corruption 
involved in the reported spy satellite acquisition. Notwithstanding this, two 
concluding remarks can be made out of this study case. First, it can be 
clearly stated that the contravention or not of information protection laws by 
publishing information on the military spy satellite can only be properly 
adjudicated by a court of law. Second, despite the inconclusive nature of the 
findings on the question of whether legislation was contravened, it can be 
argued that the published news articles are likely to have negatively impacted 
on national security to certain degree.  
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Two concluding remarks can be made related to this case study. First, it can 
be clearly stated that the contravention or not of information protection laws 
by publishing information on the military spy satellite can only be properly 
adjudicated by a court of law. Second, despite the inconclusive nature of the 
findings on the question whether legislation was contravened, it can be 
argued that the published news articles were likely to have negatively 
impacted on South Africa’s national security to certain degree.  
 
Against the background of these findings, it can be concluded that the 
relatively tense relations between the South African government and the 
press is likely to continue unless the two find a common understanding of the 
perimeters of state secrecy versus transparency. Flowing from this it can also 
be concluded that the finding of this research can be viewed as the general 
approach with which the domestic press handles issues relating to national 
security. There may be polarised interpretations of the findings of this case 
study by government, civil rights activists and security experts. It is therefore 
concluded that the final arbiter on an issue such as this has to be a court of 
law. A better working relationship, however, is likely to improve the trust 
between government and the press, thereby reducing tension between them. 
 
Finally, it is worth-noting that the effectiveness of information protection 
legislation cannot always be ensured because unauthorised disclosure of 
classified information or material can be achieved by media operating outside 
the borders of South Africa, but accessible worldwide through the internet. A 
question to answer is whether information protection legislation is still a 
relevant instrument to protect state information considering the 
interconnectedness of global information systems with the advent of 
information technology revolution.  
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7. Appendices  
 
7.1  List of interviewees 
7.1.1  Mr S Brummer (interview - 2/6/2016) 
7.1.2 Mr JJ Joubert (interview - 2/6/2016) 
7.1.3 Ms A Hotz (interview - 15/6/2016)  
7.1.4 A Journalist - prefer to remain confidential (interview -13/62016) 
7.1.5 Two SSA officials – names withheld for security reasons (interview - 
6/6/2016) 
7.2 Interview Questionnaire 
7.2.1 Journalists 
I. What is your opinion on the state of media freedom, in particular the 
press, in South Africa?  
II. Do you think that journalists are free to do their work in South Africa? 
III. What did you intend to inform the public by reporting on the military 
spy satellite? For example, did you intend to expose procurement 
irregularity or corruption? 
IV. Do you agree with those who may say the publication of the 
acquisition of spy satellite by the DOD may harm national security and 
why? 
V. Do you think the media should exercise restraint when reporting on 
issues relating to national security? 
VI. How did you determine if the public interest outweighs the need for 
secrecy and vice versa? How do you balance public interest and 
national interest in the context of freedom of expression? 
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7.2.2 Right2know 
I.  What is your opinion on the legal provision that government should be 
allowed to keep some of its activities secret on the grounds of national 
security?  
II.  What is your opinion regarding the disclosure by the press of 
information on Consolidated Project Flute – the acquisition of a spy 
satellite for Defence Intelligence? Are you in support of or against the 
disclosure and why? 
 
7.2.3 Security stakeholders 
 
I.  What are your comments regarding the published news articles? 
II.  Do you think the articles compromised the SANDF in any way? 
-  Do you think the disclosed information will possibly affect the SANDF’s 
future related procurement project? Will the disclosed information have 
the potential to impact on defence intelligence’s future operations in 
any way? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
